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INTRODUCTION
As of June 2018, approximately fifty-four percent of Americans
support the death penalty,1 while thirty-nine percent are opposed to it.2
Furthermore, when given a choice between lethal injection, the electric chair,
the gas chamber, firing squad, or hanging, sixty-five percent of people opined
that lethal injection is the most humane form of punishment.3 Despite this
public approval, data from 2014 might surprise many, showing that lethal
injection has had the highest rate of errors in executions when compared to
all of these purportedly less-humane methods.4 Evidence of these botched
executions directly contradicts states’ proposition that lethal injection is
“quick, clean and painless.”5 What if lethal injection is actually the least
humane method to date, but no one sentenced to execution by lethal injection
can prove that it is cruel and unusual punishment?
In a spirited dissent to the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in a
recent case alleging that Alabama’s lethal injection protocol is cruel and
unusual, Justice Sonia Sotomayor contemplated this very issue by saying,
“What cruel irony that the method that appears most humane may turn out to
be our most cruel experiment yet.”6 The controversial lethal injection method
that was at issue then also was challenged in an earlier case, Glossip v. Gross,
which is the focus of this note.7 In Glossip, the Supreme Court affirmed and
applied a test for assessing claims regarding whether a particular method of
execution violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.8
Considering the significance of the death penalty and the
longstanding debate surrounding the bounds of its constitutionality, the
Supreme Court has heard numerous arguments regarding the
constitutionality of capital punishment and specific methods of execution
implemented by the states. The Supreme Court now considers it well-settled,
however, that capital punishment is constitutional.9 Furthermore, never once
1. This note uses the terms “death penalty” and “capital punishment” interchangeably.
2. Death Penalty Information Center, National Polls and Studies, https://
deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/public-opinion-polls/national-polls-and-studies#
pew2018 (last visited September 14, 2019) [https://perma.cc/PGH8-UDTZ].
3. Death Penalty, GALLUP, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/national-polls-and-studies#
pew2018 (last visited Aug. 14, 2019) [https://perma.cc/R8XK-76JM].
4. AUSTIN SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES: BOTCHED EXECUTIONS AND AMERICA’S
DEATH PENALTY 123 (2014); see generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 369 (1972)
(Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that the public does not fully understand the current state of
the death penalty and that if they did, they would have different views about it).
5. SARAT, supra note 4, at 6.
6. Arthur v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 725, 733 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
7. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015), aff’g by an equally divided court Warner
v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721 (10th Cir. 2015).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
9. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177
(1976)).
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has the Court struck down a state’s method of execution as unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment,10 giving states considerable flexibility in how
to implement a sentence of death. Consequently, the Court’s conclusion that
the death penalty is constitutional has implicitly led to the idea that all
possible methods of execution must also be deemed constitutional.
This note concludes that the Glossip test for determining when a
method of execution runs afoul of the Eighth Amendment and constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment improperly limits Eighth Amendment
protection. Therefore, it should be overturned in favor of a new, more
practical and impartial test that would lighten the prisoners’ burden and hold
states more accountable while still enabling states to carry out executions.
Part I begins by examining the history of the death penalty in America,
specifically exploring the nation’s journey through various execution
methods and the conclusion that lethal injection is the most humane method.
Part II discusses the Supreme Court decision in Baze v. Rees11 and the
subsequent case, Glossip v. Gross,12 which led to the Court’s arrival at the
current test for assessing challenges to execution methods under the Eighth
amendment. Part III illuminates the problems that the Glossip test creates.
Finally, Part IV contends that the Supreme Court should overrule Glossip
and proposes an alternative test for assessing method of execution cases.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF EXECUTION METHODS IN AMERICA
The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted,”13 and it initially only applied to the federal government.14 The
Fourteenth Amendment provided a vehicle by which the Bill of Rights,
including the Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause of the Eighth
Amendment, could be equally binding on state and local governments.15 The
language in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mirrors
that of the Fifth Amendment16 and served as the basis for the selective
incorporation doctrine. The Supreme Court used this doctrine to determine
which rights protected by the Bill of Rights were fundamental to our concept
of “ordered liberty” such that they needed to be honored by the states as well
as the federal government.17
In 1962, the Supreme Court expressly ruled that the Eighth
Amendment applies to the states with regard to the Cruel and Unusual

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 48.
Id. at 47.
Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737–38.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Raff Donelson, Who Are the Punishers?, 86 UMKC L. REV. 259, 279 (2017).
THOMAS G. WALKER, ELIGIBLE FOR EXECUTION 54 (2008).
U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–25 (1937).
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Punishment Clause.18 Although the death penalty violates the Eighth
Amendment when imposed on certain offenders19 and for certain offenses,20
the death penalty itself has never been found to violate the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment nor any other provision of the Constitution.21
Textual interpretations of the Due Process Clause suggest that there must be
instances in which someone’s life may be constitutionally taken.22 Therefore,
the framers accepted the death penalty as a tolerable form of punishment.23
Throughout America’s experiment with capital punishment, the
prevailing method of execution has evolved consistent with the prevailing
views that the next method is more humane than the last.24 Hanging was the
primary method of execution in the United States for many years, and over
half of the executions carried out in the United States have been by hanging.25
Execution by hanging required only rope and a tree or scaffold, so it could
be easily implemented regardless of the available resources.26 People likely
preferred hanging because it was easy to perform and because the public
nature of it served a desired penological purpose, general deterrence.27 The
rationale was that if the entire community witnessed a criminal being hung,
it would encourage them to refrain from committing a crime themselves.28
Hanging continued to prevail as the leading method of execution
until the late 1800s when the New York Legislature appointed a commission
to discover “the most humane and practical method known to modern science
of carrying into effect the sentence of death in capital cases.”29 As a result of
the commission’s findings in 1890, the state of New York performed the first
execution by electrocution.30 The United States Supreme Court approved
electrocution as an acceptable method because it did not “involve torture or
a lingering death” or “something inhuman and barbarous.”31 New York’s
use of electrocution represented a major turning point, as many states
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
19. See Death Penalty Information Center, Crimes Punishable by the Death Penalty,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/crimes-punishable-death-penalty (last visited Aug. 14, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/4UMW-KPZG] (listing all of the crimes for which each state has made the
death penalty an available punishment).
20. Id.
21. WALKER, supra note 15, at 59.
22. Id. at 59–60.
23. Id. Noting this context, this note merely examines method of execution challenges
and makes no attack on the constitutionality of the death penalty.
24. WALKER, supra note 15, at 57; Chris Wilson, Every Execution in U.S. History in a
Single Chart, TIME (Apr. 25, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://time.com/82375/every-execution-in-u-shistory-in-a-single-chart/ [https://perma.cc/3VYE-BBBK].
25. See Wilson, supra note 24.
26. Richard C. Dieter, Methods of Execution and Their Effect on the Use of the Death
Penalty in the United States, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 789, 790 (2008).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890).
30. Dieter, supra note 26, at 790–91.
31. Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447.
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followed New York’s lead, triggering a shift in favor of this new, more
private method of execution.32
In 1924, Nebraska introduced another method of execution—lethal
33
gas. With this method, a prisoner is locked inside a gas chamber and
expected to breathe deeply to expedite the process.34 Although Nebraska, like
New York, sought a more humane method of execution in developing the gas
chamber, witnesses asserted that there was “evidence of extreme horror, pain,
and strangling. The eyes pop. The skin turns purple and the victim begins to
drool.”35 Therefore, the search for a more humane method of execution went
on.
Finally, in 1977, Oklahoma introduced the method that is commonly
used today, lethal injection.36 Bill Wiseman, an Oklahoma legislator trying
to assuage his guilty conscience, conceptualized lethal injection.37 Although
Wiseman fundamentally opposed the death penalty, his political aspirations
caused him to disregard his beliefs and vote in favor of the death penalty.38
In an effort to minimize the impact of his decision to support the death
penalty, Wiseman sought help from the Oklahoma State Medical Examiner,
Jay Chapman, to develop the first three-drug cocktail to be used in an
execution.39 Today, all of the states that allow the death penalty have lethal
injection as a method.40 Despite the intent to effect a more humane, dignified
death, evidence is beginning to suggest that lethal injection, like execution
methods that preceded it, might be just as distasteful as the methods that were
abandoned in favor of it.41
While lethal injection remains the most widespread method of
execution among the states, it is not the only method that is approved under
the various state laws.42 Other methods include hanging, electrocution, and
the gas chamber.43 Death by firing squad, however, never gained the
32. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2732 (2015); see Wilson, supra note 24.
33. Death Penalty Information Center, Descriptions of Execution Methods [hereinafter
“DPIC, Descriptions”], https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/descriptions-execution-methods (last
visited Aug. 14, 2019) [https://perma.cc/BL2Q-EQ3D].
34. Id.
35. JACOB WEISBERG, THIS IS YOUR DEATH 26 (1991).
36. DPIC, Descriptions, supra note 33.
37. Oklahoma Man Who Developed Lethal Injection Recipe Lived with Regret, NEWS
ON 6 (May 1, 2014, 8:20 PM), http://www.newson6.com/story/25406037/oklahoma-man-whodeveloped-lethal-injection-recipe-lived-with-regret [https://perma.cc/6WXS-3WVB].
38. Id.
39. Rick Lowery, The Bible and Lethal Injection: Why the Man Who Wrote Oklahoma’s
Law Opposed the Death Penalty, HUFFPOST (July 27, 2014, 6:28 PM), https://
www.huffingtonpost.com/rick-lowery-phd/the-bible-and-lethal-injection_b_5395445.html
[https://perma.cc/3VAA-475X].
40. DPIC, Descriptions, supra note 33.
41. See Zaria Gorvette, The People Rethinking Methods of Execution, BBC FUTURE
(June 6, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20180604-is-there-a-humane-way-to-kill-acriminal [https://perma.cc/Z28D-JJAN].
42. DPIC, Descriptions, supra note 33.
43. Id.
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popularity of the other methods.44 It is worth noting, however, because Utah
reinstated it as a backup method in 2015 as a result of a nationwide shortage
of common lethal injection drugs.45 Like Utah, most states have statutes that
allow for backup methods of execution that provide for alternative methods
if the primary method is unavailable or found to be unconstitutional.46
Currently, however, only three states have a provision allowing for firing
squads: Utah, Mississippi, and Oklahoma.47
While the death penalty is predominantly a state issue given the
significantly higher number of persons executed by the states,48 the federal
government also utilizes the death penalty.49 Unlike some of the state laws
addressed above, federal law does not list alternative, backup execution
methods.50 The Code of Federal Regulations provides the following: “Except
to the extent a court orders otherwise, a sentence of death shall be executed
. . . [b]y intravenous injection of a lethal substance or substances in a quantity
sufficient to cause death. . . .”51
Lethal injection is undisputedly the principal method of execution in
America,52 and the historical trend of abandoning execution methods in favor
of more humane ones suggests that the death penalty states and the federal
government believe that lethal injection is the most humane method to date.53
As this note will address, there is evidence to the contrary. Consequently, one
would expect that a death row inmate could successfully challenge lethal
injection as an inhumane method of execution. Two recent Supreme Court
cases serve as examples of inmates attempting such a challenge.

44. See Wilson, supra note 24.
45. Utah Brings Back Firing Squad Executions; Witnesses Recall the Last One, NPR
(Apr. 5, 2015, 7:15 PM), https://www.npr.org/2015/04/05/397672199/utah-brings-backfiring-squad-executions-witnesses-recall-the-last-one [https://perma.cc/HSQ9-5H55].
46. Death Penalty Information Center, Methods of Execution [hereinafter “DPIC,
Methods”], https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/methods-execution (last visited Aug. 14, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/5WVA-4BNL].
47. Id.
48. Death Penalty Information Center, State & Federal Info, https://
deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/federal-death-penalty (last visited Aug. 11, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/EW4D-RYL6].
49. Death Penalty Information Center, Federal Laws Providing for the Death Penalty,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-laws-providing-death-penalty (last visited Aug. 14, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/9CNF-MYWP].
50. See id.
51. 28 C.F.R. § 26.3 (2019).
52. DPIC, Methods, supra note 46.
53. See Dieter, supra note 26, at 814–15.
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II. EIGHTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE REGARDING METHOD OF
EXECUTION CHALLENGES
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the death penalty
is not per se unconstitutional.54 As such, the Justices are hesitant to declare
that a state’s chosen method of execution is unconstitutional because such a
ruling could threaten the death penalty as a whole.55 The Court’s opinions in
Baze v. Rees56 and subsequently, Glossip v. Gross,57 which reaffirmed Baze,
outline the test used to determine whether a state’s execution method
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment that is violative of the Eighth
Amendment. This section explains these decisions and lays the groundwork
for the current landscape regarding method of execution challenges.
A. Baze v. Rees
The Supreme Court issued a plurality opinion for Baze v. Rees in
2008, when thirty-six states and the federal government had capital
punishment as an available sentence for certain crimes.58 At that time, every
jurisdiction that utilized capital punishment, including Kentucky, the subject
of the case, used lethal injection as a potential method of carrying out the
execution.59 The petitioners in Baze, Ralph Baze and Thomas Bowling,60
were both convicted of double homicides and sentenced to death. The death
sentence called for both Mr. Baze and Mr. Bowling to be executed by lethal
injection.61 Similar to most other states, Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol
called for a three-drug cocktail using sodium thiopental, pancuronium
bromide, and potassium chloride.62 The drugs, used in that order, are intended
to render the individual unconscious, paralyze his or her body, and finally,
induce cardiac arrest.63
Petitioners Baze and Bowling contended that Kentucky’s lethal
injection method constituted cruel and unusual punishment because there
was a risk that the protocol might not be administered properly and could,
therefore, result in significant pain.64 The trial court, in a bench trial, heard
testimony from approximately twenty witnesses, including some experts, and
found that the risk of incorrect administration of the protocol was minimal,
54. Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721, 728 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S.
47, 47 (2008)), aff’d sub nom., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
55. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732–33, 2738.
56. Baze, 553 U.S. at 50.
57. Glossip 135 S. Ct. at 2737–38.
58. Baze, 553 U.S. at 40.
59. Id. at 40–41.
60. Id. at 46.
61. Id. at 41.
62. Id. at 44.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 41.
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considering the numerous safeguards65 included. The case went to the
Kentucky Supreme Court, which determined that an execution method
violates the Eighth Amendment when it “creates a substantial risk of wanton
and unnecessary infliction of pain, torture or lingering death.”66 Noting the
applicable standard, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s
decision.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in a plurality opinion
authored by Chief Justice Roberts,67 agreed that Kentucky’s protocol
survived the Eighth Amendment.68 The by-product of this opinion was a twoprong test in which inmates, to successfully argue that their method of
execution violates the Eighth Amendment, must show that the chosen
execution method presents “a substantial risk of serious harm,” which has
also been described as an “objectively intolerable risk of harm.”69
Additionally, the inmates must plead and prove an alternative execution
method that is “feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly
reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain.”70
Inmates must prove, therefore, that the challenged method presents
a risk that is “substantial when compared to the known and available
alternatives.”71 Finally, if an inmate meets this burden and presents a feasible
alternative, there is one more inquiry for the Court. There might be cruel and
unusual punishment if the state cannot proffer a “legitimate penological
justification” for retaining its current execution method and refusing to adopt
the inmate’s proposed alternative in light of its proven benefits.72
Before applying the articulated test to the facts of Baze, the Court
noted that it would be difficult to characterize Kentucky’s execution method
as “objectively intolerable” because it is in fact “widely tolerated.”73 In
making this observation, the Court was referring not only to the nationwide
tolerance of lethal injection as an acceptable method in general, but also to
the exact three-drug protocol Kentucky used.74 At the time, thirty states and
the federal government used the same combination of drugs: sodium
thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride.75
65. The trial court and the Supreme Court found the following safeguards of the
protocol, among others, to be significant: only qualified personnel with at least one year of
professional experience are responsible for inserting the IV catheters, the warden and deputy
warden stay in the execution chamber to ensure that the first drug is successful and to watch
for problems with the tubing, and a physician is present to help revive the prisoner in the event
of a last-minute stay of execution. Id. at 45–46.
66. Id. at 46 (quoting Baze v. Rees, 217 S.W.3d 207, 209 (Ky. 2006)).
67. Justices Kennedy and Alito joined the opinion. See id. at 63, 71.
68. Id. at 47.
69. Id. at 50 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 846 n.9 (1994)).
70. Id. at 52.
71. Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 52.
73. Id. at 53.
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 902 (6th Cir. 2007)).
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The Court went on, however, to acknowledge that this “broad
consensus” was not per se dispositive.76 The fact that lethal injection was
widely tolerated and used was merely the beginning of the Court’s analysis.
The Court assessed the validity of the petitioners’ claim by declaring that the
petitioners had the “heavy burden” of showing that Kentucky’s lethal
injection procedure is “cruelly inhumane.”77 The potential for inaccurate
administration of the first drug in the process was the gravamen of the
petitioners’ challenge. The Court accepted the uncontested fact that if a
prisoner did not get an accurate dose of the sodium thiopental sufficient to
result in unconsciousness, “a substantial, constitutionally unacceptable risk
of suffocation from the administration of pancuronium bromide and pain
from the injection of potassium chloride” would follow.78
The Court was not impressed with the petitioners’ argument that
such an error was likely to occur, however. The Court determined that the
instructions being printed on the package, explaining how to calculate and
mix the dosage, made it doubtful that the sodium thiopental would be
prepared incorrectly.79 Similarly, anticipated issues with the IV lines were
also not enough to sway the Court because of the numerous safeguards
included in Kentucky’s protocol.80 The most significant safeguard, according
to the Court, is the requirement that the IV team members must have at least
one year of relevant professional experience.81 Therefore, the “risks” that the
petitioners asserted were neither “so substantial or imminent” as to serve as
the foundation for an Eighth Amendment violation.82 The Court highlighted
the protocol’s safeguards as evidence that the alleged risks of harm were
unlikely, thus negating most of the petitioners’ argument.83
Accordingly, the Court held that petitioners had not satisfied the first
prong of the test because they failed to prove that there was a “substantial
risk of serious harm.”84 Despite this, the Court still considered the fact that
the petitioners did propose an alternative that would use only a single drug.
Notably, however, it was a procedure that no state had tried or even
adopted.85 Since that method had never been used, petitioners had no
evidence or data demonstrating its effectiveness.86 Because of this, the Court
concluded that Kentucky’s refusal to adopt the proposed method did not
implicate Eighth Amendment concerns.87 Similarly-situated inmates hoping
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id. (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976)).
Id. (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. 27).
Id. at 54 (quoting 5 Tr. 695 (Apr. 19, 2005)).
Id. at 55.
Id.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 53–54.
See id. at 41, 56.
Id. at 56–57.
See id. at 56–57, 62.

2019]

GLOSSIP AND METHOD OF EXECUTION CHALLENGES

175

to propose novel execution methods encounter this same obstacle of having
no evidence to support the method’s efficacy.
B. Glossip v. Gross
The Supreme Court decided Glossip v. Gross88 approximately seven
years after Baze. Richard Glossip was one of twenty-one inmates on death
row who brought a 42 U.S.C. § 198389 claim challenging Oklahoma’s lethal
injection protocol under the Eighth Amendment.90 All of the inmates faced
death sentences as a result of first-degree murder convictions.91 Four
plaintiffs—Charles Warner, Richard Glossip, John Grant, and Benjamin
Cole—filed for a preliminary injunction to stay their executions until the
overall case was decided on the merits because they had set execution dates.92
The basis of the complaint was that the first of the three drugs used in
Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol, midazolam, would not serve its
essential purpose of rendering the inmates insensate to pain.93 This first drug
is intended to shield the inmate from the discomfort of receiving the paralytic
and ultimately, the cardiac arrest-inducing drug.
The District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma denied the
prisoners’ preliminary injunction because it found the prisoners’ arguments
that midazolam has a ceiling effect and could result in paradoxical reactions
and negligent administration speculative.94 Applying the standard from Baze,
the District Court found that the prisoners had failed to show that the chosen
lethal injection protocol presents a substantial risk of pain when compared to
known and available alternatives.95 In essence, the prisoners were unable to
prove that Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol presented a substantial risk
of harm. Additionally, they did not sufficiently plead and prove that there is
a feasible, readily implemented alternative method. The Tenth Circuit
affirmed, finding no grounds upon which to reverse.96
By the time the case got to the Supreme Court, one of the petitioners,
Charles Warner, had already been executed with the three-drug cocktail
88. Id.
89. To summarize, § 1983 creates a cause of action allowing individuals to allege a
deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2017).
90. Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721, 723 (10th Cir. 2015), aff’d sub nom., Glossip v.
Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
91. Id. at 723.
92. Id. at 723–24.
93. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731.
94. The plaintiffs argued that midazolam has a ceiling effect, meaning that after a certain
dosage level is administered, “incremental increases in dosage . . . have no corresponding
incremental effect.” Warner, 776 F.3d at 726. Additionally, the plaintiffs contend that
midazolam presents a risk of paradoxical reactions such as “agitation, involuntary movements,
hyperactivity, and combativeness” that makes midazolam inapt as a “stand-alone anesthetic.”
Id. at 726–27 (quoting ROA Vol. 1 at 960).
95. Id. at 731 (quoting ROA Vol. 3 at 927).
96. Id. at 735–36.
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utilizing midazolam.97 Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion, ruling
against the remaining petitioners.98 The central theme of the opinion was that
rigorous standards must be maintained because without them, challenges to
a particular method of execution could serve as a means of dismantling the
death penalty, itself.99 Those rigorous standards were articulated by the Court
in Baze and affirmed in this case.100
The Court utilized three important principles as the basis for that
affirmation. First, because it is well-established that capital punishment is a
constitutional form of punishment, “[i]t necessarily follows that there must
be a [constitutional] means of carrying it out.”101 Second, in the long history
of the death penalty in America, the Court has never found a state’s chosen
method of execution to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.102 Finally,
even the most humane methods of execution may result in some inherent risk
of pain, however, “the Constitution does not demand the avoidance of all risk
of pain.”103
With these principles in mind, the Court looked to what was
articulated in Baze as the appropriate test, considering whether the method in
question presented a substantial risk of serious harm and whether the inmates
sufficiently proved that there was a feasible, readily implemented alternative
that would significantly reduce the substantial risk of pain.104 The test can be
more succinctly explained as determining whether the challenged execution
method presents a substantial risk of harm “when compared to the known
and available alternatives.”105
The Supreme Court explained that the first prong means showing
that the risks presented are “sure or very likely to cause serious illness and
needless suffering.”106 In considering this, the Court gave great weight to the
fact that many courts have concluded that midazolam is likely to render an
inmate sufficiently insensate to pain and determined that the inmates in this
case had not met their burden in proving the contrary.107 In further explaining
the Court’s analysis of the first prong, Justice Alito markedly stated that
“federal courts should not ‘embroil [themselves] in ongoing scientific
controversies beyond their expertise.’”108

97. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2726, 2734.
98. Id. at 2731.
99. See id. at 2738, 2738.
100. Id. at 2746; Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 61 (2008).
101. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732–33 (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 47).
102. Id. at 2732 (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 48).
103. Id. at 2795 (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 47) (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 2737–38.
105. Id. at 2737 (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 61).
106. Id. (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 50).
107. Id. at 2739–40.
108. Id. at 2740 (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 51).
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The majority also concluded that the inmates failed to prove that
there was a “known and available alternative method of execution.”109 The
inmates proposed the use of sodium thiopental (or pentobarbital in the
absence of sodium thiopental) as a single-drug protocol because these drugs
are arguably better-able to render an inmate insensate.110 These proposed
drugs had both been used in successful executions, but the Court affirmed
the lower courts’ determination that both were now unavailable.111 Although
these inmates proposed two well-tested drugs, they could not satisfy the
alternative prong. Without directly explaining whether pentobarbital or
sodium thiopental would be substantially less painful than midazolam, the
Court concluded that both of these proposed drugs were unavailable.112
Justice Breyer’s dissent and Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion
debated solely the constitutionality of the death penalty in general, which is
beyond the scope of this note.113 However, Justice Thomas’s concurrence
warrants some discussion.114 Thomas posed the following questions, which
have remained unanswered since the Baze decision: “At what point does a
risk become ‘substantial’? What makes an alternative procedure ‘feasible’
and ‘readily implemented’? When is a reduction in risk ‘significant?’ What
penological justifications are ‘legitimate?’”115 This note does not undertake
the task of answering these questions, but it highlights the fact that they
remain unanswered, leaving inmates unsure of what is required of them.
Thomas also argued that an execution method only violates the
Eighth Amendment “if it is deliberately designed to inflict pain.”116 He
contended that the inmates in this case had no valid claim since they did not
attempt to argue that Oklahoma chose midazolam specifically to “add
elements of terror, pain, or disgrace to the death penalty.”117 This is an
intriguing conclusion, but it is one that is not supported by the language or
policy of the Eighth Amendment because the amendment provides for an
outright prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments,118 not one that is
effective only if the state’s purpose was to inflict torture. This must be the
case because to think otherwise would mean that if a state proposed a method
of execution that would be sufficiently torturous simply because it was their
only option, it would not violate the Eighth Amendment by Justice Thomas’s
approach.

109. Id. at 2738.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2733–34, 2738.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2746 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2755 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 2750 (Thomas, J., concurring).
115. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 105 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring).
116. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2750 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 94
(Thomas, J., concurring)).
117. Id. (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 107).
118. Id. at 2780–81 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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Finally, Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion explained that if the
midazolam did not function as intended, the use of the remaining drugs in the
protocol would torturously cause “burning, searing pain” while the inmate is
unable to express discomfort due to the paralytic.119 Contrary to the majority,
Sotomayor concluded that the inmates furnished ample evidence to show that
this risk posed by the state’s use of midazolam was substantial and
constitutionally intolerable.120 Mainly, petitioners showed that midazolam
has a ceiling effect, above which higher dosages are ineffective.121
Sotomayor posited that the majority ignored substantial evidence suggesting
that even if midazolam effectively induces unconsciousness, it is incapable
of maintaining that state when confronted with the pain caused by the
subsequent drugs.122
Sotomayor concluded by arguing that the Court’s ruling on the
alternative prong was “legally indefensible,”123 and turned what should be a
categorical ban on cruel and unusual punishment into a conditional one.124
Rather than definitively banning cruel and unusual punishment, the Court
now finds a method of execution unconstitutional only if there is a “known
and available alternative.” Additionally, since Baze was a plurality opinion,
Sotomayor noted that the alternative requirement did not represent the
majority view and was not the holding.125 She further analyzed the Baze
opinion to support her contention that what the majority in Glossip
articulated as the prong of the test that requires plaintiffs to prove that there
is an available alternative was not actually what the plurality meant,126 but
for purposes of this note, it is assumed that the current test is what the
majority applied in Glossip.
The rule outlined in Glossip resulted in much commentary and
criticism, and the debate is far from over.127 Justice Sotomayor has reiterated
her dissatisfaction with the test and the challenges it causes, but to date, she
has been unable to change the landscape of method of execution cases.128 The

119. Id. at 2780–81 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 2781 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 2783 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 2785 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 2792 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 2793 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
125. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 2793–95 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
127. See Glossip v. Gross Coverage and Commentary Recap, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/glossip-commentary (last visited Aug. 14, 2019) [https://
perma.cc/RR55-NGJQ].
128. There are multiple instances in which Justice Sotomayor dissented and expressed
concerns regarding Glossip. See generally Zagorski v. Haslam, 139 S. Ct. 20 (2018); Zagorski
v. Parker, 139 S. Ct. 11 (2018); Irick v. Tennessee, 139 S. Ct. 1 (2018); Arthur v. Dunn, 137
S. Ct. 1838 (2017); Arthur v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 725 (2017); Warner v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 824
(2015).
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subsequent section of this note highlights some of these issues and indicates
that Justice Sotomayor’s stance is the most logical.129
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE ADOPTED TEST
In response to Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion in Baze, Chief
Justice Roberts declared, “the standard we set forth here resolves more
challenges than [Justice Stevens] acknowledges.”130 Despite that belief, Baze
and Glossip left many unanswered questions that lower courts have struggled
to answer.131 The Supreme Court’s failure to adequately define the contours
of what must be proven in a successful method of execution case under the
Eighth Amendment is causing inconsistencies between the circuit courts.132
Even if the Court had gone further and defined each part of the test, however,
Glossip should still be overturned for four reasons. First, it is inconsistent
with the Eighth Amendment and limits the protections therein. Second, it
unfairly creates an errant standard that is nearly impossible for inmates to
satisfy. Third, the misguided standard that Glossip imposes gives states too
much deference, thus allowing the state to use virtually any execution method
they choose. Finally, the states’ unconstrained autonomy over executions
compromises the integrity of drug manufacturing companies.
Society has accepted lethal injection under the potentially misguided
belief that it is humane and simple, but there is mounting evidence to show
that the first drug in many states’ lethal injection protocol does not and,
indeed, cannot work as needed or anticipated.133 Prior executions using
midazolam indicate that upon administration of the second and third drugs,
inmates might wake up and be conscious of the pain that the first drug was
supposed to shield them from.134 Despite such evidence that lethal injection
has the potential to result in lingering and painful death, the Supreme Court
has shielded it from Eighth Amendment scrutiny by adopting the Glossip test
that makes it impossible for an inmate to prove that lethal injection could be
cruel and unusual punishment.
The definitive effect of the Glossip test is that the protections
guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment collapse. Additionally, all future
method of execution challengers are fighting a losing battle due to both the
high burden of proving an alternative and the importance the Supreme Court
129. See infra Part III.
130. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 61 (2008).
131. Debra Cassens Weiss, Federal and State Judges Block Executions of Eight Arkansas
Inmates; State Appeals, ABA J. (Apr. 17, 2017, 8:20 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/federal_and_state_judges_block_executions_of_seven_arkansas_inmates_state_
a [https://perma.cc/D5TT-QQMN].
132. Tyler Baum, McGhee v. Hutchinson: The Cruel and Unusual Battle with Eighth
Amendment Method-of-Execution Claims, 11 J. MARSHALL L.J. 110, 115–16 (2017).
133. Inventor of Midazolam Opposes Its Use in Executions, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
URL (last visited Jan. 25, 2019) [https://perma.cc/CG9S-KWRZ].
134. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2782 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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has placed on maintaining deference to the states in upholding the
constitutionality of the death penalty.
A. Limited Eighth Amendment Protection
As Justice Sotomayor explained in her dissenting opinion in Glossip,
the implication of the majority’s test is that even a very painful execution
method would violate the Eighth Amendment “if, and only if, there is a
‘known and available alternative’ method of execution.”135 The Eighth
Amendment categorically prohibits cruel and unusual punishment136 and
thus, a finding of a violation should not be based on whether another
punishment is available that would be less painful. The Court’s current
jurisprudence, nonetheless, limits the scope of the Eighth Amendment’s
protection.137
A historical look at method of execution cases ranging from the first
one before the United States Supreme Court to today reveals that the
Supreme Court has never invalidated a state’s chosen method of execution
as unconstitutional. The Court has appeared comfortable acknowledging that
certain barbaric methods are clearly unconstitutional, and declared that
“[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death. . . .
It implies there something inhuman and barbarous,—something more than
the mere extinguishment of life.”138 While people are not guaranteed a
painless death,139 one that causes lingering death or an inhumane end should
be considered cruel and unusual. Therefore, the Glossip test contravenes this
idea by making Eighth Amendment protection provisional, especially since
the required condition is too difficult to meet.
Inmates allege that midazolam, the controversial lethal injection
drug challenged in Glossip—and other cases140—is incapable of adequately
rendering someone unconscious, resulting in the sensation of being
chemically burned from the inside.141 Despite evidence of the limitations and
problems that are possible with midazolam, even when administered as
written by state protocols,142 the Supreme Court will not conclude that it is
cruel and unusual unless the inmates can sufficiently satisfy the alternative
requirement of Glossip. This is a flawed and illogical result.
135. Id. at 2793 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
136. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 305 (1989).
137. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); WALKER, supra note 15, at 56.
138. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
139. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 37 (2008).
140. Other states have faced litigation after adding midazolam to their protocols. See
generally Abdur’Rahman v. Parker, 558 S.W.3d 606 (Tenn. 2018).
141. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2781 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
142. Dave Boucher, Tennessee Warned About Use of Controversial Drug Combination
for Lethal Injection, TENNESSEAN (Jan. 19, 2018, 1:30 PM), https://www.tennessean.com/
story/news/crime/2018/01/19/tennessee-warned-use-controversial-drug-combination-lethalinjections/1046487001/ [https://perma.cc/BAF2-YFUV].
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By this standard, an execution method might be deemed cruel and
unusual one day, because there is a substantially safer alternative. And yet,
that same method would be constitutional on another day or in another state,
merely because there are no alternatives. Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion
listed four factors supporting his assertion that the death penalty should be
outlawed, and one of the factors is arbitrariness.143 The arbitrariness of
method of execution claims is correspondingly unpalatable.
If a state decided to execute someone by burning them at the stake,
which is determinedly torturous, they would be able to do so if the inmate
was unable to show that there was an available alternative. This is even more
problematic than it may initially appear because, not only does the alternative
method have to be feasible, readily implemented, and available, but it also
has to be an enumerated method that the state provides for by statute.144 This
aspect of the test will be discussed further, but it completely contravenes an
important purpose of the Eighth Amendment by requiring the inmate to show
that the state has authorized another, safer method before being able to find
relief from cruel and unusual punishment. The burden of the alternative
prong has the unfortunate consequence of giving too much deference to the
states at the expense of the inmates’ Eighth Amendment protections.
B. Unfair Burden on Death Row Inmates
Before Glossip, the Supreme Court had never held that a method of
execution challenge required the proposal of an alternative.145 In previous
cases, proving an alternative was a way for petitioners to indicate that the
purpose of the suit was not to nullify their death sentence under the pretextual
claim that the specific method is unconstitutional.146 In declining to accept
the government’s view that a petitioner must prove an alternative, the Court
previously explained that “as long as the civil rights challenge did not
foreclose execution, it was properly styled, and the condemned prisoner was
not required to plead or prove an alternative method of execution.”147 The
Court should return to this reasoning and reject the stringent alternative
requirement.
This section argues that the Supreme Court set a bad precedent in
choosing to defend the death penalty and all proposed methods to such an
extent as to disregard the constitutional protections guaranteed to death row
inmates. The Court has created a “perverse requirement” and a “macabre
challenge”148 that compels condemned prisoners to propose an alternative
143. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2755–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
144. Arthur v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 840 F.3d 1268, 1314–15 (11th Cir. 2016).
145. Megan McCracken, Legally Indefensible: Requiring Death Row Prisoners to Prove
Available Execution Alternatives, 41 CHAMPION 46, 47 (2017).
146. See Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (2006); Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637
(2004).
147. McCracken, supra note 145, at 47.
148. Irick v. Tennessee, 139 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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method for their own executions. In addition to the manifestly unorthodox
nature of placing this burden on the prisoners rather than the states, there is
the additional consequence that it is an unattainable standard.149
Consideration of post-Glossip cases shows that the burden the Court
has crafted is too heavy to satisfy. In Arthur v. Commissioner, Alabama
Department of Corrections, Alabama’s chosen method of execution used the
same three drugs that the petitioners in Oklahoma challenged in the Glossip
case: midazolam, rocuronium bromide,150 and potassium chloride.151 Thomas
Arthur, who was a death row inmate in Alabama, presented what the District
Court for the Middle District of Alabama deemed “impressive” evidence
regarding the risks posed by midazolam. However, because the district court
concluded that Arthur had failed to meet the “known and available
alternative” requirement, the court did not consider this evidence.152
Arthur had initially proposed a single drug protocol utilizing either
pentobarbital or sodium thiopental, which were both the primary lethal
injection drugs prior to a national shortage153 that resulted in the use of
midazolam.154 After the district court found that these drugs were not
available, Arthur filed a motion to amend his complaint to propose the firing
squad as his alternative.155 The district court denied Arthur again because,
according to the court, the firing squad was also not a feasible or readily
implemented alternative because Alabama does not provide for it by
statute.156 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
judgment in the state’s favor.157
Alabama’s death penalty statute expressly states the approved
methods of execution.158 Because the statute does not explicitly allow the
firing squad, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it was beyond the authority
of the Department of Corrections and declined to consider Arthur’s evidence
regarding the dangers of midazolam.159 This is one example of an inmate that
presumably had enough evidence to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that midazolam poses a substantial risk of severe harm but could not win his

149. McCracken, supra note 145, at 48.
150. Oklahoma used pancuronium bromide, but the Court explained in Glossip that
pancuronium bromide, vecuronium bromide, and rocuronium bromide are all virtually
equivalent in that they act as a paralytic. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2735 (2015).
151. Arthur v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 840 F.3d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 2016).
152. Arthur v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 725, 728 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
153. Anti-death penalty advocates rallied to get manufacturers to stop making the drugs,
which had the ironic consequence that no death row inmates have available alternatives to
argue. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2733–34.
154. Id. at 2734.
155. Arthur, 137 S. Ct. at 728 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
156. Id.
157. Arthur v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 840 F.3d 1268, 1314–15 (11th Cir. 2016).
158. ALA. CODE § 15-18-82.1(c) (2019).
159. Arthur, 137 S. Ct. at 728 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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Eighth Amendment challenge because he could not successfully propose
another method despite three attempts to do so.160
Unfortunately, The Supreme Court did not endeavor to define what
makes a proposed alternative “feasible” or “readily implemented,”161 so it is
unclear whether the Eleventh Circuit was correct. When considering the
common, dictionary definitions of the terms, it seems reasonable to think that
the firing squad could meet these requirements because it would be an
instantaneous death that requires little resources. Merriam-Webster defines
“feasible” as “capable of being carried out”162 and “readily” as “without
much difficulty.”163 Under these definitions, Arthur clearly met his burden,
but Glossip has been interpreted to mean that the method must also be
expressly authorized by the state’s execution statute.164 One court markedly
suggested that this understanding of the availability requirement places a near
“impossible burden” on plaintiffs challenging their method of execution,165
which is the one of the main issues with Glossip that this note highlights.
Surprisingly, the Sixth Circuit held in a 2017 case that the plaintiffs
successfully argued that pentobarbital was an available alternative despite
Ohio being unable to purchase it and having none on hand because the
plaintiffs proposed using compounded pentobarbital.166 The plaintiffs argued
that, to succeed, they needed to propose a method that is possible, not
necessarily one that the state has on hand.167 This is a more lenient standard
than what other circuits have adopted168 and shows that death row inmates
are not only saddled by the crude requirement of Glossip. They are also
subject to the inconsistency of not knowing how the circuit they are in will
160. Justice Sotomayor concluded that he had met his burden for both prongs of Glossip
because he “amassed significant evidence that Alabama’s current lethal-injection protocol will
result in intolerable and needless agony, and he has proposed an alternative—death by firing
squad.” Id. at 725 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
161. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 105 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring); In re Ohio
Execution Protocol, 853 F.3d 822, 836 (6th Cir. 2017), vacated, 855 F.3d 702.
162. Feasible, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
feasible (last visited Aug. 14, 2019) [https://perma.cc/R8XT-XHZW].
163. Readily, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
readily (last visited Aug. 14, 2019) [https://perma.cc/LRY4-ZEPY].
164. The Supreme Court has not explicitly said this, but the Court has also not stepped
in to correct the Circuits that have declared that this is required. See McGehee v. Hutchinson,
854 F.3d 488, 493 (8th Cir. 2017); Arthur v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 840 F.3d 1268,
1300 (11th Cir. 2016).
165. McGehee v. Hutchinson, No. 4:17-CV-00179 KGB, 2017 WL 1399554, at *39
(E.D. Ark. Apr. 15, 2017).
166. Drugs from compounding pharmacies, unlike those from regular drug
manufacturers, are distributed without approval from the Food and Drug Administration and
are subject to little regulation and no testing. This leads to the following common issues:
“subpotency, superpotency, contamination, overmedication, and medication-replacement.”
Jesse M. Boodoo, Compounded Drug Products and the FDAMA Circuit Split, 36 AM. J.L. &
MED. 220, 225 (2010).
167. In re Ohio Execution Protocol, 853 F.3d 822, 836 (6th Cir. 2017), vacated, 855 F.3d
702.
168. McGehee, 854 F.3d at 500 (Kelly, C.J., dissenting).
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interpret “alternative.” The courts are divided and need answers from the
Supreme Court,169 so it should not be long before there is an opportunity to
correct these issues along with the others that resulted from Glossip.
Despite the Sixth Circuit’s more lenient approach, a recent case in
Tennessee, Abdur’Rahman v. Parker, highlighted the issue of this undue
burden on method of execution challengers.170 Despite others’ failure, thirtythree death row inmates in Tennessee sought a declaration that the state’s
lethal injection protocol violated the Eighth Amendment, mainly due to the
risks posed by midazolam.171 The inmates proposed pentobarbital as an
alternative since it was one of two options written in Tennessee’s execution
protocol.172 Two days after the inmates proposed pentobarbital, the
Tennessee Department of Corrections changed the protocol to remove
pentobarbital as an alternate method.173
Despite expert testimony about midazolam’s failure to act as a
sufficient analgesic, the feeling of suffocation caused by vecuronium
bromide, and the burning feeling of potassium chloride, the Tennessee
Supreme Court focused on the inmates’ failure to prove an alternative and
affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint.174 One of the inmates,
Billy Ray Irick, was scheduled to be executed on August 9, 2018, and when
the Supreme Court denied his application for a stay of execution, Justice
Sotomayor again dissented.175
Justice Sotomayor lamented, “If the law permits this execution to go
forward in spite of the horrific final minutes that Irick may well experience,
then we have stopped being a civilized nation and accepted barbarism.”176
Tennessee proceeded to execute Irick utilizing the debated drug, and
witnesses observed him choking, moving his head, and straining against the
restraints on his arms.177 Dr. Lubarsky, the expert witness who testified for
the inmates at trial, indicated that Irick was likely not in a general plane of
anesthesia while being killed, and was therefore subject to the “torturous
effects” of the drugs.178 This unfortunate outcome was largely a result of the
inmates being unable to satisfy the insuperable burden required by Glossip.
In addition to providing an example of someone suffering because
the Glossip requirements are impossible to satisfy, the Abdur’Rahman case
169. Id.
170. Abdur’Rahman v. Parker, 558 S.W.3d 606 (Tenn. 2018).
171. Tennessee, like Oklahoma and Alabama, uses a three-drug protocol beginning with
midazolam, followed by vecuronium bromide and potassium chloride. Id. at 610, 612.
172. Id. at 612.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 626.
175. Irick v. Tennessee, 139 S. Ct. 1 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
177. Steven Hale, Medical Expert: Billy Ray Irick Was Tortured During Execution,
NASHVILLE SCENE (Sept. 7, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.nashvillescene.com/news/pith-inthe-wind/article/21021361/medical-expert-billy-ray-irick-was-tortured-during-execution
[https://perma.cc/2FR9-TDBU].
178. Id.
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shows states’ willingness to act in bad faith to shield their chosen execution
methods. The Tennessee Department of Corrections initially had the option
to execute using the three-drug protocol or pentobarbital alone, but
conveniently decided to remove pentobarbital on the eve of trial to support
their contention that it was unavailable.179 While it is very likely that it would
have been extremely difficult for Tennessee officials to obtain pentobarbital,
their actions raised suspicions that Glossip permitted the court to ignore
because, under Glossip, inmates bear the burden of proving an alternative.
Because of Glossip’s irrational burden, what we see, as illustrated by
Abdur’Rahman, is that the state can act in bad faith and remove an alternative
from a statute, solely for the purpose of frustrating the inmate’s claim.
C. Excessive Deference to States
As Justice Alito iterated in Glossip, the purpose of the alternative
requirement of the test is to prevent inmates from attacking the death penalty
in general by presenting a pretextual argument that the methods the states
chose are unconstitutional.180 While this may be decent motivation, the
Supreme Court has drawn a very fine line between upholding the death
penalty and giving the states unconditional authority to utilize any method of
execution they choose.181 Additionally, this deference allows the states to
employ any means necessary to procure lethal injection drugs without fear
that the questionable circumstances may serve as grounds for a successful
Eighth Amendment challenge.182
If a state wanted to execute someone with an unconstitutionally
torturous method, they would be permitted to do so, as long as the relevant
statute did not provide for any other method of execution.183 Giving
deference to the states is one thing, but disregarding the Supremacy Clause
is another. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution is a crucial guarantee
that ensures that the Constitution and other federal laws take precedence over
state law.184 Accordingly, a test that essentially shields states from judicial
review cannot possibly be acceptable.185
Not only does the unlikelihood of success under Glossip give the
states an avenue to directly infringe on death row inmates’ constitutional
rights, but it also permits the states to illegally obtain execution drugs, which

179. Abdur’Rahman v. Parker, 558 S.W.3d 606, 612 (Tenn. 2018).
180. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2732–33, 2738 (2015).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Arthur v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 725, 729 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
184. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2; National Constitution Center Staff, Article VI: Prior
Debts, National Supremacy Clause, and Oaths of Office, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Feb. 21, 2014),
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/article-vi-prior-debts-national-supremacy-clause-andoaths-of-office [https://perma.cc/MSX4-N4K7].
185. Arthur, 137 S. Ct. at 729 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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may include some that are compounded and therefore, untested.186 It may
sound like a good argument for plaintiffs to say that, because the state
illegitimately obtained drugs that may not be what they are proffered as or
work as they should, their executions would be an experiment and
constitutional violation. The Glossip test, however, grants boundless ability
to the states to continue acting in a reprehensible manner because men and
women on death row are unable to convince the courts of an alternative
method for carrying out their execution.187
Because there is virtually no way that a prisoner would have the
resources to sufficiently propose an alternative, scholars have characterized
Glossip as imposing an “impossible pleading standard” that is
“unprovable.”188 This is partly due to the secrecy laws enacted by many states
that make information regarding drug acquisition, budgets, capabilities,
personnel, and all related information in the sole control of the state and not
to be disclosed.189 These secrecy laws further lead states to illegitimate
procurement methods, including the black market.190 Jennifer Moreno, a staff
attorney for the Death Penalty Clinic at the University of California,
Berkeley, School of Law, explained that “States are now buying drugs from
illegal sources, ordering new ones from compounding pharmacies or trading
with other states.”191 This behavior should be sanctioned rather than
tolerated.
The Supreme Court has essentially relished the fact that it has never
invalidated a state’s chosen method of execution,192 but “[c]ourts’ review of
execution methods should be more, not less, searching when States are
engaged in what is in effect human experimentation.”193 Especially because
the consequences not only affect the lives of the inmates that must endure the
outcome, but have larger implications as well.
D. Jeopardized Integrity of the Pharmaceutical Industry
Because the result of Glossip gives states free rein to get lethal
injection drugs by any means, the drug manufacturers are forced to bolster

186. Boodoo, supra note 166, at 225; McCracken, supra note 145, at 46–49.
187. McCracken, supra note 145, at 49.
188. Id. at 48.
189. Id. at 48–49.
190. Brief of Amici Curiae Pharmacy, Medicine, and Health Policy Experts in Support
of Petitioner, Bucklew v. Precythe, No. 17-8151, 2018 WL 3546328, at *24 (U.S. July 23,
2018); Meghan Elizabeth Hall, Botched: The “Lethally Injected” Effect of Glossip on the
Future of Capital Punishment, 22 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 161, 175 (2017).
191. John Ericson, Botched Execution Shows Perils of Lethal Injection Drug Shortage,
NEWSWEEK (Apr. 30, 2014, 10:00 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/2014/05/16/states-gogreat-lengths-find-lethal-injection-drugs-249154.html [https://perma.cc/2EU8-Z6ZV].
192. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2732 (2015).
193. Id. at 2796 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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their attempts to protect the integrity of the industry.194 Sodium thiopental
and pentobarbital were manufactured and approved for therapeutic reasons
such as insomnia, preoperative sedation, and management of seizures.195
Once these drugs began being favored as lethal injection drugs, they quickly
became unavailable.196 There was only one manufacturer of sodium
thiopental in America, and it chose to stop making the drug altogether to
prevent its use in lethal injections, thus removing it from its intended uses as
well.197 Similarly, anti-death penalty advocates pressured European
manufacturers to stop producing pentobarbital, which became the primary
execution drug after sodium thiopental became unavailable.198
This shows how allowing the state to get the drugs however they can,
including ignoring manufacturers’ distribution controls or using the black
market, puts drug manufacturers in a tough position that compels them to
decide whether to be complacent with the improper use or to halt production
altogether to the detriment of the people for whom the drug was made.199 The
spokesperson for Lundbeck, the Danish pharmaceutical company that made
pentobarbital, stated, “This [lethal injection] is a misuse of our product. We
are in an ethical dilemma where we are opposed to the use of our medication
for capital punishment while at the same time we want to make sure that
patients who benefit from our medication get access to it.”200
Unfortunately, manufacturers’ hopes of keeping the drugs available
for those who need it proved to be difficult given the manufacturers’
contemporaneous commitment to keeping the drugs out of prisons.201
Pharmaceutical companies face fiscal, reputational, and legal risks when
their drugs end up being used for lethal injections.202 These companies
currently have no meaningful way of ensuring that their products are not
being used for lethal injections due to the secrecy laws of many states and
the states’ willingness and ability to disregard implemented distribution
controls. The Lethal Injection Information Center created a risk index

194. Teri Schultz, Europe Fights the Death Penalty—With Drugs, PUB. RADIO INT’L
(May 13, 2011, 10:03 AM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2011-05-13/europe-fights-deathpenalty-drugs [https://perma.cc/6MVV-NZUX].
195. Francisco Lopez-Munoz et al., The History of Barbiturates a Century After Their
Clinical Introduction, 1 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE & TREATMENT 329, 329–30 (2005).
196. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2733.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Schultz, supra note 194.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Respecting Corporate Contracts: State-by-State Risk Index, LETHAL INJECTION
INFO. CTR. (2018), http://lethalinjectioninfo.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/State-by-StateRisk-Index.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZ9C-ZM8Q].
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highlighting which states pose the greatest threat for misuse of drugs, with
eighteen states being categorized as high-risk.203 It explained:
Despite repeated requests from pharmaceutical companies
that their medicines not be diverted for use in capital
punishment, Alabama has pressed ahead in its efforts to
secure these firms’ products under the cover of a sweeping
secrecy law. In doing so, Alabama officials may be
knowingly and deliberately undermining the contractual
restrictions that companies have established to prevent the
same of their drugs to death rows.204
Courts should consider such illegitimate acquisition methods in
assessing whether a method of execution is constitutional. However, because
of Glossip, petitioners’ claims consistently fail at the outset when they are
unable to overcome the burden of demonstrating an alternative method of
execution. Prisoners, unlike the states, are not allowed to break the law in
search of execution drugs, so Glossip presents an unfair advantage in favor
of the states. Consequently, pharmaceutical companies are left having to sue
the states for improper acquisition and use in defiance of the companies’
stance against executions.205
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the Supreme Court’s objective in keeping method of
execution claims from dismantling the entire system of capital punishment
was sound, Glossip missed the mark. Criminal defense lawyer and author,
Clive Stafford Smith wrote, “[W]e know that mistakes are inevitable, so
roughly what error rate are we willing to accept, in light of the value of our
goal?”206 No one expects the Court to issue flawless opinions that create winwin situations for everyone involved, but how much are we willing to ignore
in furtherance of the idea that there must be constitutional means of
implementing the death penalty?
The bad precedent set forth in Glossip should be overruled and
replaced by a new test because the Glossip decision limits the protection
awarded by the Eighth Amendment, presents a challenge that cannot be won,
allows states to go unchecked, and compromises the pharmaceutical industry.
The new test should involve a threshold inquiry and a burden-shifting
203. High-risk states include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Indiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
204. Alabama is just one example of a state that has ignored regulations put in place
without being reprimanded. Id.
205. See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel Jr., Nevada Execution Is Blocked After Drugmaker Sues,
N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/2B5P-5LX6.
206. CLIVE STAFFORD SMITH, THE INJUSTICE SYSTEM ix (2012).
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framework, resulting in a more balanced approach that will require some
accountability on the states’ part.
A. Overturning Precedent
At times, the Supreme Court opts to uphold conceivably bad
decisions because the Justices value precedent.207 The long-standing
principle of stare decisis means that the Supreme Court is expected to adhere
to previous rulings until there is adequate reasoning to abandon the prior
ruling.208 The purpose of reverencing precedent is to provide predictability
and finality.209 However, this is not always the best option.
To Justice Thomas, precedent is never a sufficient reason for
upholding bad law,210 so he is perhaps the most likely to change his vote in
favor of the four dissenters in Glossip.211 Justice Scalia once said of Thomas,
“[He] doesn’t believe in stare decisis, period.”212 Despite Thomas being an
outlier in this belief, he is unwavering in pushing his colleagues to reevaluate
their decisions when they have gotten it wrong.213 For Thomas, “the ultimate
precedent is the Constitution.”214 Although not ideal, the Court must overrule
precedent to correct mistakes.215
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
when deciding whether to overturn the controversial holding of Roe v.
Wade,216 the Court discussed factors to consider when assessing the effect of
overturning precedent.217 The Court explained that the purpose of these
“prudential and pragmatic considerations” is to “test the consistency of
overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the
respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”218
Justice O’Connor listed the following inquiries as the basis for this
consideration: (1) “whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in
defying practical workability”; (2) “whether the rule is subject to a kind of
207. Randy Kozel, The Problem of Precedent, WASH. POST (July 10, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/07/10/the-problem-ofprecedent/ [https://perma.cc/369G-8RKZ].
208. WALKER, supra note 15, at 55.
209. Id.
210. Lincoln Caplan, Clarence Thomas’s Brand of Judicial Logic, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22,
2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/23/opinion/sunday/clarence-thomass-brand-ofjudicial-logic.html [https://perma.cc/XTK5-8H6W].
211. Glossip was a 5–4 decision with Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan
dissenting. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2732 (2015).
212. Caplan, supra note 210.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. The Court held in Roe that women’s constitutional right to privacy encompasses the
right to choose to have an abortion. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 114 (1973).
217. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992).
218. Id. at 854.
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reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling
and add inequity to the cost of repudiation”; (3) “whether related principles
of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a
remnant of an abandoned doctrine;” and (4) “whether facts have so changed,
or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant
application or justification.”219 The Supreme Court decided Glossip v. Gross
approximately seven years after Baze v. Rees.220 Analysis of these factors
indicates that, when Glossip was decided, the Court should have voted to
overturn Baze. The circumstances that fuel this necessity are even more true
today.
The first inquiry is whether the rule has proven to be intolerable
simply in defying practical workability.221 This is arguably the factor that
weighs the most heavily in favor of overturning Glossip. The rule is entirely
unworkable and left multiple unanswered questions, leaving lower courts lost
as to what the Justices meant.222 Part III outlined the issues with Glossip that
need not be reiterated,223 but should be noted as the basis for finding that this
factor favors abandoning Glossip.
Next, the Court must consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of
reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling
and add inequity to the cost of repudiation.224 The Eighth Amendment, like
all of the amendments included in the Bill of Rights, is meant to protect
citizens from overreach by the government.225 The rule of law from Glossip
does the opposite, and the people subject to its effects cannot be said to be
relying on it such that overturning it would lead to inequity or hardship for
them. To the contrary, overruling Glossip would benefit people whose Eighth
Amendment rights are currently in jeopardy because of the condition that
Glossip placed on those rights.
Third, the Court must ask whether related principles of law have so
far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a “remnant of
abandoned doctrine.”226 It is doubtful that there is any conceivable way to
construe this factor in favor of abandoning Glossip. The Court decided it a
mere four years ago, in 2015, and it cannot be considered “a remnant of an
abandoned doctrine.”227
Finally, the Court must assess whether facts have so changed, or
come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant
application or justification. Since Glossip, more states have begun using
219. Id. at 854–55.
220. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).
221. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854.
222. Baze, 553 U.S. at 105 (Thomas, J., concurring).
223. See supra Part III.
224. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854.
225. See Robert A. Sedler, The Enduring Constitution of the People and Protection of
Individual Rights, 66 U.S. MICH. B. J. 1108, 1108 (1987).
226. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855.
227. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015); Casey, 505 U.S. at 855.
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midazolam despite the arguments for its inefficacy. While the problem is
bigger than the use of this one drug, midazolam’s failures indicate that the
Court got it wrong in declaring it constitutional simply because there was no
alternative.228
Since the Court decided Glossip, there have been numerous botched
executions and mishaps involving midazolam,229 but even one is one too
many when people’s well-being and constitutional rights are at stake. In
2016, Alabama executed Ronald Smith using midazolam, and he experienced
prolonged heaving and gasping before dying.230 The following year,
Arkansas used midazolam to execute Kenneth Williams, and witnesses
observed him “coughing, convulsing, lurching, and jerking.”231 These are not
the only examples of the drug going awry, and as states began to see the
problems with it, some began to voluntarily abandon its use.232 Midazolam
was a newer execution drug when Glossip was decided, and there was not
yet evidence of its failures. Now, however, there is increasing evidence of
the pain people have suffered from midazolam, so much so that states are
choosing to stop using it. Therefore, the facts surrounding whether the use of
midazolam in lethal injections is constitutional have sufficiently changed,
and they have changed in such a way that favors overruling Glossip.
The Court decided Roe v. Wade in 1973, encompassing a woman’s
right to an abortion as a part of the right to privacy.233 In deciding whether to
overturn Roe, the Court said in Casey, “where the Court acts to resolve the
sort of unique, intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe, its decision
has a dimension not present in normal cases and is entitled to rare
precedential force to counter the inevitable efforts to overturn it and to thwart
its implementation.”234 While the Court was right to uphold Roe, the weight
that the Justices placed on appearing steadfast in sticking to their opinion
despite pressure is a dangerous premise that should not be applied in this
context.235
Although precedent is important and leads to consistency, the Court
is charged with making decisions that promote justice and are consistent with
the spirit of the Constitution. While it is arguable that an analysis of the Casey
228. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737–38.
229. Death Penalty Information Center, Botched Executions,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-lethal-injection (last visited Aug. 23, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/GM2T-F8JE].
230. Id.
231. Max Brantley, Death in Arkansas: The Botched Execution of Kenneth Williams and
the Fallout, or Lack of It, ARK. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2017, 10:08 AM), https://arktimes.com/
arkansas-blog/2017/11/13/death-in-arkansas-the-botched-execution-of-kenneth-williamsand-the-fallout-or-lack-of-it [https://perma.cc/M8ZR-T798].
232. Death Penalty Information Center, State by State Lethal Injection, https://
deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/lethal-injection/state-by-state-lethal-injection-protocols (last
visited Aug. 14, 2019) [https://perma.cc/RMX8-YLCP].
233. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 114 (1973).
234. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 836 (1992).
235. Id.
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factors indicate that the Court could overturn Glossip with a clear conscience,
if the Court feels it must sustain precedent by reaffirming Glossip, it could
follow the Casey decision in a different regard. In Casey, the Court analyzed
the abovementioned factors and its reasons for not overturning Roe, while
nevertheless chiseling away at it and completely revamping abortion
regulations in the process.236 As in Casey, the Court could similarly say it is
upholding Glossip while practically changing its core to reflect its changing
standards.
Roe presented the “trimester framework,” which provided that,
during the first trimester, the states may not regulate abortions; during the
second trimester, the government may begin to place increasing restrictions
on abortions if they are related to maternal health; and during the third
trimester, the government may prohibit abortions except when it affects
mothers’ well-being because the government’s interest in potential life
becomes compelling at the point of viability of the fetus.237 Although the
Court claimed to be reaffirming Roe’s central holding in Casey, it rejected
the trimester framework and held that the proper standard is that of undue
burden.238
In assessing whether the abortion regulations in Casey were undue,
the Court essentially used a rational basis standard.239 This new standard
allowed the Court to hold that requiring a 24-hour waiting period before
allowing an abortion was not an undue burden,240 and such a regulation does
not seem to align with Roe at all. Therefore, if the Court wants to say it is
upholding the premise of Glossip, that lethal injection cannot be used as a
means to unravel the death penalty, it can do that while still altering the inner
workings and practical effects of the decision.
While stare decisis is valued because it leads to reliability based on
previous decisions, ultimately, the best route is for the Court to follow Justice
Thomas’s approach and abandon precedent in this instance.241 With an issue
as pressing as capital punishment, there are advocates with valid opinions on
both sides. But in cases where the method of execution is not wellestablished, life should be valued over death.

236. Id. at 837.
237. Roe, 410 U.S. at 114.
238. Casey, 505 U.S. at 873–74.
239. Rational basis refers to the level of judicial scrutiny the Court applied and defines
how closely the Court is assessing the law. Rational basis, or minimal scrutiny, gives great
deference to the government, which often leads to laws being upheld. R. George Wright, What
If All the Levels of Constitutional Scrutiny Were Completely Abandoned?, 45 U. MEM. L. REV.
165, 169 (2014).
240. Casey, 505 U.S. at 886–87.
241. See Caplan, supra note 210.
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B. Proposed Approach
The Court left some uncertainty on how to properly apply the
requirements of Glossip.242 As subsequent cases have illustrated, there are
many unanswered questions, including to what extent an inmate must prove
that an alternative is “feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly
reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain.”243 Theoretically, there are two
options before the Court: (1) uphold the two-prong test of Glossip and clarify
the open questions about what it truly requires; or (2) overrule Glossip and
completely rework the test. As the preceding section assessed, Glossip
warrants being overturned.244 The Court should adopt a test that is
unambiguous and practical, while still balancing the states’ important
penological justifications and the interest of the inmates’ lives.
Because of the ambiguity in what a death row inmate must prove in
proposing an available alternative, no one can be sure what the Court was
looking for. Surely it would not be sufficient for one to simply suggest that
there are probably other things that might be less painful. Conversely, the
other end of the spectrum would be a requirement that demands specifics
from the prisoner, such as precise options including willing manufacturers
and appropriate dosages. What, then, should the Court look for in method of
execution claims?
Currently, the burden is on the inmate to show that their execution
method poses a substantial risk of harm when compared to available
alternatives that significantly reduce that risk of harm.245 This burden
presents the inmate with an insuperable obstacle and should therefore be
reassessed.246 The Court should adopt a burden-shifting framework that
makes it at least possible that an inmate could succeed.
To assess an Eighth Amendment challenge of a proposed method of
execution, courts should first look to the inmate to see if he or she can prove
the threshold inquiry of whether the proposed method presents a substantial
risk of serious harm. To satisfy this threshold inquiry, the inmate should have
to present non-speculative evidence, such as the known ceiling effect of
midazolam and testimony explaining previously botched executions. To
satisfy this standard, the inmate will have to show that the risk of harm
exceeds the pain that may be inherent in any death.247
If an inmate can successfully meet this threshold, the burden should
then shift to the state to show that: (1) there are no available alternatives that
would significantly reduce the risk of severe pain; and (2) the penological
interests in performing the execution outweigh the risk of harm that the
242. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 105 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring).
243. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2737 (2015) (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 52).
244. See supra Section IV.A.
245. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2740.
246. See supra Section III.B.
247. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2733.
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inmate faces. If a state makes a good faith effort to secure other acceptable
methods to no avail, it should still have to make a showing that there are
reasons to justify putting the inmate at risk of serious harm.
The “feasible” and “readily implemented” language from Baze and
Glossip can still be included in the analysis, of whether there is an available
alternative that would significantly reduce the risk of severe pain, but the
terms should be given clear definitions.248 A “feasible” method would be one
that does not present an unreasonable burden on the state financially or
otherwise. Furthermore, a “readily implemented” method would mean that
the state does not have to expend unwarranted amounts of time or funds
acquiring the materials or preparing for implementation. If an available
method is going to be incredibly complicated and require extensive training
and money, a state should not be required to use it. If, on the other hand, a
state has people willing to volunteer to implement an execution by firing
squad, that would be an example that is feasible and readily implemented.
C. Rationale Supporting the Proposed Approach
Adopting a threshold inquiry, after which the validity of a claim is
triggered, is ideal because in many failed method of execution claims,
plaintiffs’ evidence about the risk of harm was largely ignored due to their
failure to prove an alternative.249 With the changed approach, courts will have
to assess the weight of evidence offered to show that a method is likely to
cause unnecessary suffering. The standard for this should be preponderance
of the evidence, which is the standard of proof in most civil cases.250 This
standard of proof requires that a fact be more likely than not.251
Once this showing is met, the state would have to provide evidence
indicating that they exerted a good-faith effort to find and implement
reasonable and safe alternatives.252 This burden shift is necessary because it
adds a layer of accountability on the states that would prevent them from
adopting known controversial protocols and circumventing legal methods of
acquisition. States would therefore be more likely to stick to appropriate
measures for obtaining necessary execution drugs,253 which would also have
the added benefit of pharmaceutical companies having less trouble keeping
drugs out of executions if they desire to do so.254

248. Id. at 2737; Baze, 553 U.S. at 52.
249. See Abdur’Rahman v. Parker, 558 S.W.3d 606, 616 (Tenn. 2018).
250. Evidentiary Standards and Burdens of Proof, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/trialslitigation/lawsuits-and-the-court-process/evidentiary-standards-and-burdens-of-proof/ (last
visited Aug. 14, 2019) [https://perma.cc/7HVE-GUBP].
251. Id.
252. This requirement would not compel violations of the secrecy laws. Rather, states
could simply redact names and identifying information when explaining their efforts.
253. See supra Section III.C.
254. See supra Section III.D.
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It makes more sense and is fairer to have the state prove whether
there is an alternative because this information is much more accessible for
state officials than for death row inmates and their attorneys. Indeed, states
have ensured that only state officials have this information by enacting the
secrecy laws,255 making the burden-shifting approach even more appropriate.
This approach also prevents states from shielding execution methods by
neglecting to provide for any alternatives expressly by statute256 because the
state, itself, will be considering alternative methods it can and may use.
Finally, this burden-shifting framework is supported by public policy257
because it encourages states to think about how they are choosing to
implement executions by exploring all viable options and selecting those that
are likely to meet judicial scrutiny.
Additionally, evaluating various factors related to who should bear
the burden of proof supports the proposed burden-shifting framework. There
are several factors that courts consider when determining who should bear
the burden of proof.258 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, for example, uses
five factors to help determine how to allocate the burden of proof.259 The
factors are as follows: (1) “the natural tendency to place the burden on the
party desiring change”; (2) “special policy considerations such as those
disfavoring certain defenses”; (3) convenience; (4) fairness; and (5) “the
judicial estimate of the probabilities.”260 At least three of the factors favor
putting the burden on the state.
First, plaintiffs hoping to change the current landscape of the law
expectedly bear the burden of proof or persuasion.261 Clearly, death row
prisoners would be the ones seeking change, so this factor favors placing the
burden on them, which is the rationale for requiring them to at least make a
threshold showing before the state can be troubled with proving that there are
no feasible alternatives.
Second, the consequences of putting the full weight on the prisoners,
outlined in Part III, would advance the assertion that this factor supports
shifting the burden to the state.262 If the burden remains on the prisoners, the
result is the disfavored fact that states can implement and alter execution
statutes so as to keep prisoners from proceeding because the prisoners’
proposed method is not in the statute. Because this allows states to act
unconstitutionally by removing alternatives from the statutes, it is a less than
ideal allocation of the burden.
255. See supra Section III.C.
256. See Abdur’Rahman v. Parker, 558 S.W.3d 606, 612 (Tenn. 2018).
257. SARAT, supra note 4, at 4.
258. Martin J. LaLonde, Allocating the Burden of Proof to Effectuate the Preservation
and Federalism Goals of the Coastal Zone Management Act, 92 MICH. L. REV. 438, 440
(1993).
259. State v. McFarren, 215 N.W.2d 459, 463 (Wis. 1974).
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Third, the convenience factor is the most important in this context.
Courts have explained that “where the facts with regard to an issue lie
peculiarly in the knowledge of a party, that party has the burden of proving
the issue.”263 The states are in a much better position to know what methods
are available, if any, and what is feasible given the capacity of the staff and
the budget, as well as the secrecy laws that put information regarding
executions in the sole possession of state officials. Arguably, this factor alone
is enough to shift the burden to the state.
Fourth, the fairness factor includes proof of exceptions and proof of
negatives.264 Proof of exceptions is inapplicable because there are no
exceptions to the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment that anyone would need to assert. Because this proposed burdenshifting test solicits the proof of a negative (i.e., there is no available
alternative that is feasible, readily implemented, and significantly reduces the
risk of harm), the party that asserts that the negative is true should have the
burden of proving it. Here, that party is the state.
Finally, the last factor assesses the obscurity of what the parties are
arguing and suggests that the burden should be on the party who is arguing
the more unusual circumstance.265 Because courts very rarely determine that
execution methods violate the Eighth Amendment, this factor would weigh
against placing the burden on the state. Ultimately, however, there is still a
legitimate argument that the burden shift is appropriate in this context when
weighing all of the factors.
If the state can meet its burden showing that there are no available
alternatives, the structure of this proposed test would conclude by requiring
the state to show that, if there is indeed no available alternative, the state
should be allowed to proceed with its chosen method because it has a
penological justification that outweighs the potential risk of harm to the
inmate. The “penological justification” language was also used in Baze266 but
has not been assessed because inmates have never been able to suggest an
alternative to allow courts to reach this issue. This balancing approach would
help courts determine when it is appropriate to uphold the method and when
the Eighth Amendment should step in and protect an inmate from an
unjustifiable risk of harm.
CONCLUSION
As Henry David Thoreau said in Civil Disobedience, “Unjust laws
exist: shall we be content to obey them, or shall we endeavor to amend
them . . . ?”267 Glossip v. Gross is a prime example of an unjust law that
263. Id.
264. Id. at 464–65.
265. Id. at 465.
266. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 47, 52 (2008).
267. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND OTHER ESSAYS 367 (1906).
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prejudices death row inmates: is stare decisis enough to warrant upholding
it, or is it time to change the approach to method of execution claims?
Considering the ever-changing landscape of the death penalty and
the fact that the Eighth Amendment draws its meaning from the “evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,”268 it is
time for the Supreme Court to review its previous rulings on method of
execution claims. Since Glossip, more evidence has emerged that previouslyaccepted execution methods cannot withstand appropriate constitutional
muster, which would come to light in the face of a suitable test. Failure to
reassess the Glossip requirements could result in more needless botched
executions, painful deaths, and nefarious behavior by the states.

268. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).

